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Abstract. The study of the trapdoors that can be hidden in a block cipher is
and has always been a high-interest topic in symmetric cryptography. In this
paper we focus on Feistel-network-like ciphers in a classical long-key scenario
and we investigate some conditions which make such a construction immune
to the partition-based attack introduced recently by Bannier et al.
1. Introduction
Most modern block ciphers belong to two families of symmetric cryptosystems,
i.e. Substitution-Permutation Networks (SPN) and Feistel Networks. Typically,
in both cases, each encryption function is a composition of key-dependent permu-
tations of the plaintext space, called round functions, designed in a such way to
provide both confusion and diffusion (see [20]). Confusion is provided applying
public non-linear vectorial Boolean functions, called S-boxes, whereas diffusion is
obtained by means of public linear maps, called diffusion layers. The private com-
ponent of the cipher, i.e. the key, is derived from the user-provided information by
means of a public procedure known as key-schedule. When the round functions are
made in such a way the confusion and diffusion layers are followed by the XOR-
addition with the so-called round-key, where the round-key is every possible vector
in the message space, the cipher is a long-key cipher.
Since the seventies, many researchers have studied the relationship between
some algebraic properties of the confusion / diffusion layers and some algebraic
weaknesses of the corresponding ciphers, using a permutation-group-theoretical ap-
proach. In 1975, Coppersmith and Grossman [12] considered a set of permutations
which can be used to define a block cipher and, by studying the permutation group
that they generate, they linked some properties of this group and the security of the
corresponding cipher. From this work a new branch of research was born, which
focuses on group-theoretical properties that can be exploited to attack encryption
methods. In [17], the authors proved that if the permutation group generated by
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the encryption functions of a cipher is too small, then the cipher is vulnerable to
birthday-paradox attacks. In [9] the authors proved that if such group is isomor-
phic to a subgroup of the affine group of the plaintext space, induced by a sum
different to the classical bitwise XOR, then it is possible to embed a dangerous
trapdoor on it. More relevant in [18], Paterson built a DES-like [14] cipher whose
encryption functions generate an imprimitive group and showed how the knowledge
of this trapdoor can be turned into an efficient attack to the cipher. For this rea-
son, showing that the group generated by the encryption functions of a given cipher
is primitive and not of affine type has became a relevant branch of research (see
[2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 21, 22, 23, 24]). Recently, in [5, 6] the imprimitive attack shown
by Paterson was generalized by means of a trapdoor which consists in mapping a
partition of the plaintext space into a (different) partition of the ciphertext space.
The authors also proved that only linear partitions can propagate round-by-round
in a long-key SPN. Later Calderini [8] has shown which conditions ensure that linear
partitions cannot propagate in a long-key SPN.
In this work we study some properties of the linear-partition propagation under
the action of a long-key Feistel network. In particular, our aim is to prove that also in
a Feistel-network-like long-key framework, if the cipher allows partition propagation,
then the partitions are linear one. Moreover, we provide a partial generalization of
Calderini’s result in the Feistel network case.
2. Preliminaries and notation
The notation and parameters which are set in what follows are used throughout
all this paper.
Let n ∈ N and let us denote V = (F2)n the n-dimensional vector space over
F2 equipped with the bit-wise XOR. Let us suppose dim(V ) = n = bs and let us
write V = V1 ⊕ V2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ Vb where for 1 ≤ j ≤ b, dim(Vj) = s and ⊕ represents
the direct sum of vector subspaces. The subspaces Vj ’s are called bricks. For any
I ⊂ {1, ..., b}, with I 6= ∅ and I 6= {1, ..., b}, the direct sum ⊕i∈I Vi is called a wall.
We denote by Sym(V ) the symmetric group acting on V , i.e. the group of all the
permutations on V . Let us also denote by AGL(V ) the group of all affine permu-
tations of V , which is a primitive maximal subgroup of Sym(V ). The translation
group on V is denoted by T (V ), i.e. T (V )
def
= {σv | v ∈ V, x 7→ x+ v} < Sym(V ).
Let us now introduce block ciphers, the subject of this work.
2.1. Block ciphers. Let M and K be non-empty sets, where |K| ≥ |M|. A block
cipher Φ is a family of key-dependent permutations
{EK | EK : M→M, K ∈ K},
where M is called the message space and K the key space. The permutation EK is
called the encryption function induced by the master key K. The block cipher Φ is
called an iterated block cipher if there exists r ∈ N such that for each K ∈ K the
encryption function EK is the composition of r key-dependent round functions, i.e.
EK = ε1,K ε2,K . . . εr,K . To provide efficiency, each round function is the compo-
sition of a public component provided by the designers, and a private component
3Figure 1. Round function of an SPN and of an Feistel network
derived from the user-provided key by means of a public procedure known as key-
schedule.
In the theory of modern iterated block cipher, two frameworks are mainly consid-
ered: Substitution-Permutation Networks, typically abbreviated as SPN (see e.g.
AES [13]) and Feistel networks (see e.g. [14]). Figure 1 depicts the more general
framework of SPNs, Feistel networks and their round functions; notice that inside
the round function of an Feistel network, a function called F-function is applied
to a half of the state. In both cases, the principles of confusion and diffusion sug-
gested by Shannon [20] are implemented by considering each round function (or
respectively F-function) as the composition of key-induced permutation as well as
non-linear confusion layers and linear diffusion layers, which are invertible in the
case of SPNs and preferably (but not necessarily) invertible in the case of Feistel
networks. The following definition has been given in [1] and introduces a class of
round functions for iterated block ciphers which is large enough to include the round
functions of well-established SPNs and some F-functions of Feistel networks.
Definition 2.1. A classical round function is a map of the type εk = γλσk ∈
Sym(V ), where k ∈ V and
• γ : V → V is a non-linear permutation (parallel S-box) which acts in parallel
way on each Vj , i.e.
(x1, x2, . . . , xn)γ =
(
(x1, . . . , xs)γ
(1), . . . , (xs(b−1)+1, . . . , xn)γ(b)
)
.
The maps γ(j) : Vj → Vj are traditionally called S-boxes;
• λ ∈ Sym(V ) is a linear map, called diffusion layer;
• σk : V → V, x 7→ x + k, called key-addition layer, represents the addition
with the round key k, where + is the usual bitwise XOR.
In modern literature, terms “SPN” and “Feistel network” may refer to a very
diverse variety of ciphers. For the purposes of this paper we choose to focus only on
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ciphers with a XOR-based key addition. For this reason, saying SPN we refer to any
cipher {EK | K ∈ K} ⊆ Sym(M) having an SPN-like structure with M = V and
having classical round functions on V as round functions, and saying Feistel network
to any cipher {EK | K ∈ K} ⊆ Sym(M) having an Feistel-network-like structure
with M = V ×V and having classical round functions on V as F-functions. In both
cases, the composition ρi
def
= γiλi is called the generating function of the i-th round
of the cipher. Notice that usually in real-life ciphers it holds ρ1 = idV , which means
that in the first round only a key addition is applied to the plaintext (whitening).
In this setting, an r-round cipher is defined once the list of its generating functions
ρ1, . . . , ρr and its key-schedule are given.
Once the keyK ∈ K to be used for the encryption has been chosen, the encryption
function is obtained by composing the r classical round functions induced by the
corresponding round keys, which are, as previously mentioned, derived by the key-
schedule. Hence, in the quite popular setting in which the round key is XORed to
the state, the key-schedule is a function
S : K→ V r
such that S(K) def= (k1, . . . , kr) for any K ∈ K, where S(K)i def= ki is the i-th round
key derived from the user-provided key K and εi,K = εS(K)i .
In the following section we recall some basic security notion for Boolean function
that we will use later.
2.2. Security notions for Boolean functions. The following property is the
standard request for the linear component of a block cipher to spread the input bits
as much as possible within the ciphertext.
Definition 2.2. A linear map λ ∈ GL(V ) is called a proper diffusion layer if no
wall is invariant under λ and it is called a strongly proper diffusion layer if there
are no walls W and W ′ such that Wλ = W ′.
In the remainder of this section we recall notions of non-linearity which will be
useful in this work. Let us recall that the non-linear layer of the ciphers which will
be considered throughout this work act applying vectorial Boolean functions γ(i) to
each brick of the block. Notice that we can always assume 0γ(i) = 0 without loss
of generality, since otherwise 0γ(i) can be included as part of key-addition layer of
the previous round, for each round index 1 ≤ i ≤ b (see [10, Remark 3.3]).
Definition 2.3. Let f ∈ Sym(F2)s. Let us define
δf (a, b) = |{x ∈ (F2)s | xf + (x+ a)f = b}|.
The map f is said δ-differentially uniform if
δ = max
a,b
a6=0
δf (a, b).
It is known that δ-differentially uniform functions with small δ are “farther” from
being linear compared to functions to with a larger differential uniformity. Notice
indeed that when f is linear, then δ = 2s. Let us recall that 2-differentially uni-
form S-boxes, which reach the lower bound of the previous definition, are called
Almost Perfect Non-linear (APN). Vectorial Boolean functions used as S-boxes in
block ciphers must have low uniformity to prevent differential cryptanalysis (see [7])
5and so APN S-boxes usually represent an optimal choice in terms of resistance to
differential attacks.
We conclude this section giving another notion of non-linearity that we will use
in some results of this work.
Definition 2.4 ([10]). Let 1 ≤ δ < s and f ∈ Sym(F2)s such that f(0) = 0. The
function f is strongly δ-anti-invariant if for each U and W proper and non-trivial
subspaces of (F2)s, then
Uf = W =⇒ dim(U) = dim(W ) < s− δ.
Notice that if 1 ≤ δ < δ′ < s and f is strongly δ′-anti-invariant, then it is also
strongly δ-anti-invariant.
2.3. A long-key scenario. As mentioned in the introduction, the focus of this
work is on a specific type of key-schedule, i.e. the one defined as follows:
Definition 2.5. Let Φ be an r-round cipher on M and let S : K → V r its key-
schedule. Then Φ is called a long-key cipher if S(K) = V r.
The group generated by the encryption functions of a long-key cipher and its
properties will be investigated throughout all this work. In the next section we will,
in particular, study its behavior in relation to the attacks described in the following
section.
3. Group-theoretical trapdoors
The study of groups related to block ciphers may reveal weaknesses which can be
exploited to perform algebraic attacks. In this paper, we focus on some particular
group-theoretical attacks (see e.g. [18, 5]), based on undesirable properties of such
permutation groups. Notice that the study of the group generated by the encryption
functions is a hard task in general, since the dependence on the key-schedule is not
easily turned into algebraic conditions. The aim of this work is to study Γ(Φ) in
an easier setting, i.e. the one of a long-key cipher. In particular we will focus
on Feistel networks, providing a first generalization of the results obtained in [8]
regarding SPNs. For this purpose we also make use of the following group
Γh(Φ)
def
= 〈εh,K | K ∈ K〉,
where all the possible round keys for round h are considered. From this, the group
Γ∞(Φ)
def
= 〈Γh(Φ) | 1 ≤ h ≤ r〉.
can be obtained. As mentioned in Section 1, the group Γ∞ has been extensively
studied in recent years, being the closest to the one generated by the encryption
function that can be successfully investigated. However it is worth stressing that
Γ∞(Φ) may be a-priori way larger than the actual group of the encryption functions
Γ(Φ).
The imprimitivity of such a group is one of the properties which may easily lead
an attacker to a successful break of the cipher. The imprimitivity attack and its
generalization are described in the following section.
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3.1. Imprimitive action and partition-based trapdoor. We recall that a per-
mutation group G acting on V is called called primitive if no non-trivial partition
of V is invariant under the action of G, i.e. there is no partition A of V , different
from the trivial partitions {{v} | v ∈ V } and {V }, such that Ag ∈ A for all A ∈ A
and g ∈ G. On the other hand, if a non-trivial G-invariant partition A exists, the
group is called imprimitive. Each A ∈ A is called an imprimitivity block.
The imprimitivity is a very undesirable property for group generated by the en-
cryption functions of a block ciphers. As Paterson [18] showed, indeed, if this group
is imprimitive, then it is possible to embed a trapdoor in the cipher which may
allow attacker to recover crucial key-information with way less effort than a bruce
force attack. The idea of attacking a cipher by exploiting the imprimitive action
of its group has been generalized in a recent work [5], where the partition-based
attack is introduced. The basic idea behind the attack is that, even if the group
is primitive, it may exists a sequence of partitions A1, . . . ,Ar such that the i-th
round function of each encryption function maps Ai into Ai+1. It is not hard to
notice that, provided that this condition is true, the cipher can be attacked using an
argument similar to the one exploiting the imprimitivity. In [5], the authors show
an example of such attack on an SPN.
We report here some of the definitions and results presented in [5].
Definition 3.1. Let ρ ∈ Sym(V ) and A,B be two partitions of V . Let Aρ denote
the set {Aρ | A ∈ A}. We say that ρ maps A into B if Aρ = B. Moreover, if G is a
permutation group we say that G maps A into B if for all ρ ∈ G, ρ maps A into B.
Definition 3.2. A partition A of V is called linear if there exists U < V such that
A = {U + v | v ∈ V }.
We denote A by L(U).
The following result, introduced by Harpes and Massey in [16], characterizes the
possible partitions A and B such that the translation group T (V ) maps A into B.
Proposition 1. Let A and B be two partitions of V . Then T (V ) maps A into B
if and only if A = B and A is a linear partition.
We report now the main result of [5].
Theorem 3.3. Let Φ be an r-round long-key SPN on M = V . Suppose that there
exist A and B non-trivial partitions such that for each key K the encryption function
EK maps A to B. Define A1 = A and Ai+1 = Aiρi for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, where ρi is the
classical round function for the i-th round. Assume also that ρ1 is the identity map.
Then
• Ar+1 = B
• Ai is a linear partition for any 1 ≤ i ≤ r + 1.
In the previously shown result, Bannier et al. proved that the only partitions
which propagate round-by-round are the linear ones. The next results, proved in [8],
shows which conditions are sufficient to avoid the linear-partition propagation in
the SPN case. The aim of this work is to provide a partial generalization of these
results in the Feistel network case.
7Proposition 2. Let γ ∈ Sym(V ) be a parallel S-box, i.e. γ = (γ(1), ..., γ(b)) with
γ(i) ∈ Sym(Vi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ b. Suppose that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ b the function γ(i) is
• 2δ-differentially uniform, with δ < m,
• strongly (δ − 1)-anti-invariant.
Let L(U) and L(W ) be non-trivial linear partitions of V . Then γ maps L(U) into
L(W ) if and only if U and W are wall. Moreover U = W .
As a consequence, Calderini derived the following result, which guarantees im-
munity from the partition-based attack [5].
Theorem 3.4. Let ρ1, . . . , ρr ∈ Sym(V ) and let Φ be an r-round SPN on M = V ,
where the i-th round applies ρi = γiλi such that 0ρi = 0. Let us assume that for
some 1 ≤ i < r
• γi and γi+1 are parallel maps which apply 2δ-differentially uniform and
(δ − 1)-strongly anti-invariant S-boxes, for some δ < m,
• λi a strongly-proper diffusion layer.
Then no encryption function EK maps a non-trivial partition of V into a non-trivial
partition of V .
4. Results
As previously mentioned, the aim of this work is to prove, for long-key Feistel
networks, some results which are linked to those recalled in the previous section.
We study the linear partition-propagation under the action of a long-key Feistel
network. The results obtained may be considered as a starting-point for a complete
generalization of the the results of Sect. 3.1 to Feistel networks. For this purpose,
let us consider a typical Feistel structure. Let us introduce a formal 2n× 2n matrix
which implements the Feistel structure. Such a formal matrix is defined as
ρ¯
def
=
(
0n 1n
1n ρ
)
,
where 0n in the n×n zero matrix, 1n is the n×n identity matrix and ρ¯ is called Feistel
operator induced by the generating function ρ, whose right action on (x1, x2) ∈ V ×V
is given by
(x1, x2)ρ¯ = (x1, x2)
(
0n 1n
1n ρ
)
def
= (x2, x1 + x2ρ).
Note that ρ¯ has the formal inverse matrix
ρ¯−1 def=
(
ρ 1n
1n 0n
)
.
Let us define
σ(h,k) : V × V → V × V
(x1, x2) 7→ (x1 + k, x2 + h),
and
T (V × V ) = {σ(h,k) | (h, k) ∈ V × V }.
Let Φ be an r-round long-key Feistel network acting on V ×V , having the following
i-th round function
εi,K = ρ¯iσ(0,ki),
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where ρ¯i is the i-th Feistel operator induced by ρi and ki is the i-th round key. In
this setting
(1) Γ(Φ) = 〈ρ¯1σ(0,k1) · · · ρ¯rσ(0,kr) | (k1, . . . , kr) ∈ V r〉.
Lemma 4.1. If Φ is a long-key Feistel network as above, then
〈ρ¯1ρ¯2 · · · ρ¯r, T (V × V )〉 < Γ(Φ).
In particular T (V × V ) < Γ(Φ).
Proof. In order prove that ρ¯1ρ¯2 · · · ρ¯r ∈ Γ(Φ), it is sufficient to consider the key
(k1, . . . , kr) = (0, . . . , 0). Moreover, considering the key (0, . . . , 0, kr), we obtain
ρ¯1ρ¯2 · · · ρ¯rσ(0,kr) ∈ Γ(Φ), and so σ(0,kr) ∈ Γ(Φ) for all kr ∈ V . Finally,
(x1, x2)
(
0n 1n
1n ρi
)
σ(0,k) = (x2, x1 + x2ρ+ k) = (x1, x2)σ(k,0)
(
0n 1n
1n ρi
)
,
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ r, k ∈ V and (x1, x2) ∈ V × V , so we have ρ¯iσ(0,k) = σ(k,0)ρ¯i, for
any 1 ≤ i ≤ r and k ∈ V . Therefore
ρ¯1σ(0,k)ρ¯2 · · · ρ¯r = σ(k,0)ρ¯1ρ¯2 · · · ρ¯r,
for any k ∈ V , and so σ(h,k) ∈ Γ(Φ) for any (h, k) ∈ V × V . The claim then derives
by the fact that σ(h,0)σ(0,k) = σ(h,k). 
In the following theorem we study which partitions can propagate in a long-key
Feistel network.
Theorem 4.2. Let Φ be an r-round long-key Feistel network on M = V × V .
Suppose that there exist A and B non-trivial partitions such that for each key K
the encryption function EK maps A to B. Define A1 = A and Ai+1 = Aiρ¯i, for
1 ≤ i ≤ r− 1, where ρ¯i is the Feistel operator induced by the generating function ρi
for the i-th round. Then,
• Ar+1 = B
• Ai is a linear partition, for any 2 ≤ i ≤ r.
Moreover, if A = B, i.e. Γ(Φ) acts imprimitively, then A is a linear partition.
Proof. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1 and any (x, y) ∈ V × V , we have
(x, y)ρ¯iσ(hi,ki)ρ¯i+1σ(0,ki+1) = (x+ yρi + ki, y + hi + (x+ yρi + ki)ρi+1 + ki+1)
= (x, y)ρ¯iσ(0,ki)ρ¯i+1σ(0,hi+ki+1),
and so
ρ¯iσ(hi,ki)ρ¯i+1σ(0,ki+1) = ρ¯iσ(0,ki)ρ¯i+1σ(0,hi+ki+1)
for any possible choice of hi, ki, ki+1 ∈ V . This implies that for any possible choice
of h1, k1, . . . , hr−1, kr−1, kr ∈ V the map
E = ρ¯1σ(h1,k1)ρ¯2 · · · ρ¯r−1σ(hr−1,kr−1)ρ¯rσ(0,kr)
is an element of Γ(Φ) as defined in Eq.(1). Therefore, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ r−1, we have
all the possible elements in T (V ×V ) between ρ¯i and ρ¯i+1 and so we have a similar
scenario of Theorem 3.3 ([5, Theorem 3.4]). Hence, proceeding as in Theorem 3.3,
the desired claim follows. Moreover, if A = B the group Γ(Φ) acts imprimitively on
V ×V , since all its the generators map the partition A into itself. From Lemma 4.1,
A is a block system also for T (V × V ), and so, by Proposition 1, A is linear. 
9Remark 1. Note that we have defined the action of a round function of Φ on
V × V in a such way that the corresponding round key acts on the right side of the
message after applying the generating function ρ on the right factor of V × V . In
some real-case scenarios, however, it may be possible that ρ acts after the action of
the corresponding round key. If this is the case, the i-th round function is defined
in the following way:
εi,K = σ(0,ki)ρ¯iσ(ki,0).
Indeed
(x1, x2)εi,K = (x1, x2)σ(0,ki)ρ¯iσ(ki,0)
= (x1, x2 + ki)ρ¯iσ(ki,0)
= (x2 + ki, x1 + (x2 + ki)ρi)σ(ki,0)
= (x2, x1 + (x2 + ki)ρi).
In this setting it holds that the group of the cipher with a long-key key-schedule is
G
def
= 〈σ(0,k1)ρ¯1σ(k1,k2) · · ·σ(kr−1,kr)ρ¯rσ(kr,0) | (k1, . . . , kr) ∈ V r〉,
and so we have ρ¯1ρ¯2 · · · ρ¯r ∈ G. We cannot prove that G contains T (V ×V ) as well.
Note that, as observed in the proof of Theorem 4.2, any function of the type
σ(0,k1)ρ¯1σ(k1,k2) · · ·σ(kr−1,kr)ρ¯rσ(kr,0)
can be represented as a function of type
σ(0,k1)ρ¯1σ(0,k2)ρ¯2σ(0,k1+k3) · · ·σ(0,kr−2+kr)ρ¯rσ(kr,kr−1),
which is an element of Γ(Φ), recalling that Φ represents the cipher where the key
addition is applied after the generating function. Thus, studying the properties of
Γ(Φ) gives also important informations on G, e.g. if Γ(Φ) acts imprimitively, then
so does G. More in general, partitions for Γ(Φ) are also partition for G.
In what follows, we aim at studying algebraic conditions which need to be sat-
isfied by some partitions to prevent the partition-based attack. In particular, we
classify a family of block systems which, in the case of Feistel networks, cannot
represent an exploit for partition-based cryptanalysis. It is important to point out
that the considered set of block systems contains the most used type of partitions
for cryptanalysis. In order to do so, we need to study the subgroups of the direct
product (V × V,+). We make use of the following result, due to Goursat [15, Sec-
tions 11–12], which characterises the subgroups of the direct product of two groups
in terms of suitable sections of the direct factors (see also [19]).
Theorem 4.3 (Goursat’s Lemma [15]). Let G1 and G2 be two groups. There exists
a bijection between
(1) the set of all subgroups of the direct product G1 ×G2, and
(2) the set of all triples (A/B,C/D,ψ), where
• A is a subgroup of G1,
• C is a subgroup of G2,
• B is a normal subgroup of A,
• D is a normal subgroup of C, and
• ψ : A/B → C/D is a group isomorphism.
In this bijection, each subgroup of G1 ×G2 can be uniquely written as
Uψ = {(a, c) ∈ A× C : (a+B)ψ = c+D}.
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Note that the isomorphism ψ : A/B → C/D is induced by a homomorphism ϕ :
A → C such that (a + B)ψ = aϕ + D for any a ∈ A, and Bϕ ≤ D. Such
homomorphism is not unique.
Lemma 4.4 ([3]). In the above notation, given any homomorphism ϕ inducing ψ,
we have
(2) Uψ = {(a, aϕ+ d) : a ∈ A, d ∈ D}.
Proof. Note first that the right-hand side of (2) is contained in Uψ, since for a ∈ A
and d ∈ D we have (a + B)ψ = aϕ + D = aϕ + d + D, that is, (a, aϕ + d) ∈ Uψ.
Moreover Uψ is contained in the right-hand side of (2). Indeed, if (a, c) ∈ Uψ we
have aϕ+D = (a+B)ψ = c+D, so that c = aϕ+ d for some d ∈ D. 
In the following result we consider two subgroups of V × V such that the first
is mapped into the second by a Feistel operator. We highlight some condition that
such subgroups has to satisfy. We will use the conditions derived from the next
lemma also in Theorem 4.6 and in Theorem 4.8.
Lemma 4.5. Let ρ ∈ Sym(V ) be such that 0ρ = 0 and let ρ¯ be the corresponding
Feistel operator. Suppose that there exist two subgroups U1 = {(a1, a1ϕ1+d1) | a1 ∈
A1, d ∈ D1} and U2 = {(a2, a2ϕ2 + d2) | a2 ∈ A2, d2 ∈ D2}, U1,U1 ≤ V × V , where
Ai, Di and ϕi are as in Lemma 4.4, such that
U1ρ¯ = U2.
The following properties hold:
(1) Kerϕ1 ≤ D2;
(2) D2 ≤ A1;
(3) A2 = A1ϕ1 +D1;
(4) D2ϕ1 ≤ D1.
Moreover,
(i) if D1 = {0} and D2 = {0}, then ρ is linear on A2;
(ii) if U1 = A1 ×D1 and U2 = A2 ×D2, then D1 = A2 and D2 = A1.
Proof. By assumption, for any a1 ∈ A1 and d1 ∈ D1 there exist x2 ∈ A2 and
y2 ∈ D2 such that
(a1, a1ϕ1 + d1)
(
0n 1n
1n ρ
)
= (x2, x2ϕ2 + y2),
that is
(a1ϕ1 + d1, a1 + (a1ϕ1 + d1)ρ) = (x2, x2ϕ2 + y2).
From this we derive a1ϕ1 + d1 = x2 and so A1ϕ1 +D1 ≤ A2. Moreover, since ϕ1 is
a homomorphism, we have
a1 + (a1ϕ1 + d1)ρ1 = a1ϕ1ϕ2 + d1ϕ2 + y2,
hence, considering d1 = 0 and a1 ∈ Kerϕ1, we obtain Kerϕ1 ≤ D2.
Similarly, from U2ρ¯−1 = U1, we obtain that for any a2 ∈ A2 and d2 ∈ D2 there exist
x1 ∈ A1 and y1 ∈ D1 such that
(a2, a2ϕ2 + d2)
(
ρ 1n
1n 0n
)
= (x1, x1ϕ1 + y1),
that is
(3) (a2ρ+ a2ϕ2 + d2, a2) = (x1, x1ϕ1 + y1).
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From this it follows a2ρ+ a2ϕ2 + d2 ∈ A1, and considering a2 = 0 we have d2 ∈ A1
for any d2 ∈ D2, and so D2 ≤ A1. Moreover, since a2 = x1ϕ1 + y1, we have
A2 ≤ A1ϕ1 +D1, and so A1ϕ1 +D1 = A2. By Eq.(3), we also obtain
a2 + (a2ρ+ a2ϕ2 + d2)ϕ1 = d1,
from which it follows that D2ϕ1 ≤ D1, considering a2 = 0.
If D1 = D2 = {0}, since Kerϕ1 ≤ D2, we have that ϕ1 is an isomorphism. Then
from (3) we obtain
a2ρ = a2ϕ2 + a2ϕ
−1
1 ,
for any a2 ∈ A2. The last equation implies that ρ acts linearly over A2.
If U1 = A1×D1 and U2 = A2×D2, then A1ϕ1 ≤ D1 and A2ϕ2 ≤ D2. So A2 = D1,
since A2 = A1ϕ1 + D1. Finally, since (a1, 0)ρ¯ = (0, a1) we obtain that A1 ≤ D2,
and so A1 = D2. 
In the following theorem we show that the study of the partition propagation
after two rounds of a Feistel network can be reduced to the study of the partition
propagation in a round of the corresponding SPN. A similar argument is used to
provide a reduction from the primitivity of the group generated by a Feistel network
to the one of the related SPN [1].
Theorem 4.6. Let ρ1, ρ2 ∈ Sym(V )\AGL(V ) and let ρ¯1 and ρ¯2 be the correspond-
ing Feistel operators. Suppose that there exist two non-trivial and proper subgroups
U1 and U2 of V × V such that
(1) for each (v1, w1) ∈ V × V there exists (v2, w2) ∈ V × V such that
(U1 + (v1, w1))ρ¯1 = U2 + (v2, w2),
(2) for each (v2, w2) ∈ V × V there exists (v1, w1) ∈ V × V such that
(U2 + (v2, w2))ρ¯2 = U1 + (v1, w1).
Then there exist two non-trivial and proper subgroups U and W of V such that for
each v ∈ V there exists w ∈ V such that
(U + v)ρ1 = W + w.
The same holds for ρ2.
Proof. By Lemma 4.4 we have
Ui = {(ai, aiϕi + di) | ai ∈ Ai and di ∈ Di}
for each i = 1, 2. What follows from now on holds for both i = 1 and i = 2,
where if i = 2 we consider i + 1 as (i + 1) mod 2 = 1. We can assume without
loss of generality that 0ρ1 = 0ρ2 = 0. Using assumptions 1. and 2., applying
Lemma 4.5 we obtain Ai+1 = Aiϕi + Di, Di+1ϕi ≤ Di and Kerϕi ≤ Di+1. Since
(v, w)
(
0n 1n
1n ρi
)
= (w, v + wρi) for each (v, w) ∈ V × V , in assumptions 1. and 2.
we can assume vi+1 = wi and wi+1 = vi + wiρi. Therefore, in the general case, for
any ai ∈ Ai, di ∈ Di and (vi, wi) ∈ V × V there exist xi+1 ∈ Ai+1 and yi+1 ∈ Di+1
such that
(ai + vi, aiϕi + di + wi)
(
0n 1n
1n ρi
)
= (xi+1 + wi, xi+1ϕi+1 + yi+1 + vi + wiρi)
that is, since the maps ϕi are homomorphisms,
ai + (aiϕi + di + wi)ρi = aiϕiϕi+1 + diϕi+1 + yi+1 + wiρi.
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Hence, considering ai = 0, it follows that
(Di + wi)ρi ≤ Di+1 + wiρi,
yielding |Di| ≤ |Di+1| for i ∈ {1, 2}, therefore |D1| = |D2|. Consequently, for
i ∈ {1, 2} we obtain
(4) (Di + wi)ρi = Di+1 + wiρi.
From this the desired result follows, provided that Di and Di+1 are both different
from (F2)n and both different from {0}. First note that Di = (F2)n if and only if
Di+i = (F2)n. Analogously Di = {0} if and only if Di+i = {0}.
[Di = (F2)n] Since D1 ≤ A2 and D2 ≤ A1, we have A2 = (F2)n = A1. Therefore
Ci = Bi = (F2)n for i = {1, 2}, since Ai/Bi ∼= Ci/Di, and so Ui is trivial, a
contradiction.
[Di = {0}] Since Kerϕ1 ≤ D2 = {0} and Kerϕ2 ≤ D1 = {0}, we have that
ψi = ϕi : Ai
∼=−→ Ci
is an isomorphism. Therefore
Ai ∼= Ci = Aiϕi = Ai+1 ∼= Ci+1 = Ai+1ϕi+1
and in particular |Ai| = |Ai+1|.
Since Di = Di+1 = {0}, for any ai ∈ Ai and (vi, wi) ∈ V × V there exists xi+1 ∈
Ai+1 such that
(ai + vi, aiϕi + wi)
(
0n 1n
1n ρi
)
= (xi+1 + wi, xi+1ϕi+1 + vi + wiρi),
that is
(5) ai + (aiϕi + wi)ρi = aiϕiϕi+1 + wiρi.
If Ai = {0}, then Ci = {0} and so Ui is trivial, a contradiction. Otherwise, if
Ai = (F2)n, then Aiϕi = Ai+1 = (F2)n and aiϕi+wi is an element of Ai+1 = (F2)n.
Hence in Eq. (5) we can consider wi = 0, obtaining
ai + (aiϕi)ρi = aiϕiϕi+1.
Since the function x 7→ x+ xϕiϕi+1 is linear, we proved that ρi ∈ AGL(V ), which
is a contradiction.
If Ai < (F2)n, for i ∈ {1, 2} we obtain
(aiϕi + wi)ρi = ai + aiϕiϕi+1 + wiρi.
Since ai and aiϕiϕi+1 is contained in Ai and aiϕi is an element of Ai+1 for each
ai ∈ Ai, and |Ai| = |Ai+1|, then by Eq. (5) we obtain
(6) (Ai+1 + wi)ρi = Ai + wiρi,
with Ai, Ai+1 < (F2)n. This concludes the proof: indeed, if D1 and D2 are both
proper and non-trivial subgroups of V , the claim follows from Eq. (4). Otherwise,
the claim follows from Eq. (6). 
The following result examines the converse implication of Theorem 4.6.
Theorem 4.7. Let ρ ∈ Sym(V ) and let ρ¯ be the corresponding Feistel operator. If
there exist L(U1) and L(U2) non-trivial linear partitions of V such that L(U1)ρ =
L(U2), then there exist two non-trivial linear partitions of V ×V such that L(U1)ρ¯ =
L(U2).
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Proof. Since L(U1)ρ = L(U2), for each v ∈ V there exists w ∈ V such that
(7) (U1 + v)ρ = U2 + w.
Notice that in Eq. (7) we can choose w = vρ.
Let U1 def= {(u, u′) ∈ U2×U1} and U2 def= {(u, u′) ∈ U1×U2}. Since U1, U2 are not
trivial, then also U1 and U2 are non-trivial. Let (u, u′) ∈ U1 and (v, v′) ∈ V × V ,
then we have
(u+ v, u′ + v′)ρ¯ = (u+ v, u′ + v′)
(
0n 1n
1n ρ
)
=
(
u′ + v′, u+ v + (u′ + v′)ρ
)
.
By Eq. (7), there exists u′′ ∈ U2 such that (u′ + v′)ρ = u′′ + v′ρ and so for each
(u, u′) ∈ U1 and (v, v′) ∈ V × V we obtain
(u+ v, u′ + v′)ρ¯ = (u′ + v′, (u+ u′′) + v + v′ρ) ∈ (U1 + v′)× (U2 + v + v′ρ).
Since (U1 + v
′)× (U2 + v + v′ρ) = U2 + (v′, v + v′ρ), we have(U1 + (v, v′))ρ¯ ⊆ U2 + (v′, v + v′ρ)
and so (U1 + (v, v′))ρ¯ = U2 + (v′, v + v′ρ)
since |U1| = |(U1 + (v, v′))ρ¯| = |U2 + (v′, v + v′ρ)| = |U2|. 
Remark 2. Notice that if U1 = U2 then U1 = U2. In this case, Theorem 4.7
provides the converse of Theorem 4.5 proved in [1]. In other words, the primitivity
of the group 〈 ρ, T (V )〉 is a necessary and sufficient condition for the primitivity of
the group generated by the round functions of the Feistel network acting on V × V
and having ρ as generating function for each round.
As announced, we provide a partial generalization of Theorem 3.4 in the Feistel
network case. In particular, we show some types of block systems which are not
usable for the purpose of the partition-based cryptanalysis. More precisely, we
show that if a Feistel network has a sequence of non-trivial linear partitions which
propagate from the first round to the last one, then such partitions cannot be of the
type specified in the following theorem. In other words that we are studying the
propagation of linear partitions under the action of r rounds, where each possible key
can be chosen, i.e. under the action of a long-key Feistel network. The considered
Feistel network has a generating function which is the composition of a parallel
S-box followed by a diffusion layer, i.e. an SPN-like generating function. The same
notation of Lemma 4.4 is used in the following result.
Theorem 4.8. Let ρ1, . . . , ρr ∈ Sym(V ) and let Φ be the r-round Feistel network
where the i-th round applies the Feistel operator ρ¯i induced by ρi. Let us assume
that 0ρi = 0 and ρi = γiλi, where
a) γi is a parallel map which applies 2
δ-differentially uniform and (δ − 1)-
strongly anti-invariant S-boxes, for some δ < m,
b) λi a linear strongly-proper diffusion layer.
Suppose that there exists a sequence of r + 1 non-trivial linear partitions
L(U1), . . . ,L(Ur+1), where Ui is a proper and non-trivial subgroup of V × V and
L(Ui)ρ¯i = L(Ui+1) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Then, none of the following condition is
satisfied:
(1) there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1 such that L(Ui+1)ρ¯i+1 = L(Ui),
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(2) there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1 such that Ui = Ai ×Di, Ui+1 = Ai+1 ×Di+1 and
Ui+2 = Ai+2 ×Di+2,
(3) there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ r such that Di = {0} and Di+1 = {0},
(4) there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ r such that Ai = {0} and Ai+1 = {0}.
Proof. We proceed in each case by contradiction.
(1) Let 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1 such that L(Ui+1)ρ¯i+1 = L(Ui). Then, by Theorem 4.6,
there exist Ui and Ui+1 subgroups of V such that L(Ui)ρi = L(Ui+1) and
L(Ui+1)ρi+1 = L(Ui). Then, by Proposition 2, Ui and Ui+1 are walls and
Ui+1 = Uiλi, which contradicts the fact that λi is strongly proper.
(2) Let 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1 such that Ui = Ai × Di, Ui+1 = Ai+1 × Di+1 and
Ui+2 = Ai+2 × Di+2. By Lemma 4.5, Ui = Ai × Ai+1, Ui+1 = Ai+1 × Ai
and Ui+2 = Ai ×Ai+1. This contradicts what previously proved.
(3) Let 1 ≤ i ≤ r such that Di = Di+1 = {0}, which implies Ui = {(ai, aiϕi) :
ai ∈ Ai} and Ui+1 = {(ai+1, ai+1ϕi+1) : ai+1 ∈ Ai+1}. If Ai = {0}, then
Ui is trivial. Since Di = Di+1 = {0} and Kerϕi ≤ Di+1, we have that ϕi
is an isomorphism over Ai and Aiϕi = Ai+1. Moreover, by Lemma 4.5, ρi
is linear over Ai+1. If Ai = (F2)n, then γi is linear on V , which contradicts
the fact that γi satisfies the conditions in a). Suppose now Ai < (F2)n. As
in the proof of Theorem 4.6 we obtain that
(Ai+1 + wi)ρi = Ai + wiρi
for any wi in (F2)n. Then γi maps the linear partition L(Ai+1) into
L(Aiλ−1i ). By Proposition 2, Ai+1 = Aiλ−1i , and Ai+1 is a wall. Since
ρi is linear over Ai+1, then γi is linear over Ai+1. If Vj be a brick of the
wall Ai+1, then the S-box of γi relative to the brick Vj is a linear map over
Vj , which is a contradiction.
(4) Let 1 ≤ i ≤ r such that Ai = Ai+1 = {0}. By Lemma 4.5, Di+1 ≤ Ai = {0},
hence Ui is trivial. 
It is worth noticing that the partition of point 2 in the previous theorem is of the
type of the one used by Paterson in his construction of a DES-like trapdoor cipher
(see [18, Lemma 3]).
5. Conclusions and open problems
In this work, partition propagation under the action of a long-key Feistel network
has been investigated, and some previous results [5, 6, 8] set in a long-key SPN
scenario have been generalized. In details, we proved that only linear partitions can
propagate under the action of a long-key Feistel network. Moreover, we presented
some types of block systems which are not usable for the purpose of the partition-
based cryptanalysis. In other words, we showed that if in a long-key Feistel network
a sequence of non-trivial linear partitions propagate from the first round to the last
one, then such partitions cannot be of some types used in specific attacks (see
e.g. [18]).
The problem of giving a complete generalization of Theorem 3.4 of [8] to the case
of Feistel networks is still open, as well as studying which conditions imply that the
group of the encryption functions of a long-key cipher is the alternating group both
in case of SPNs and Feistel networks.
15
References
[1] R. Aragona, M. Calderini, R. Civino, M. Sala, I. Zappatore, Wave-Shaped Round Functions
and Primitive Groups, Advances in Mathematics of Communications, 13(2019), 67–88.
[2] R. Aragona, M. Calderini, A. Tortora and M. Tota, On the primitivity of PRESENT and other
lightweight ciphers, J. Algebra Appl., 17 (2017), 1850115 (16 pages).
[3] R. Aragona, A. Caranti and M. Sala, The group generated by the round functions of a GOST-
like cipher, Ann. Mat. Pura Appl., 196 (2016), 1–17.
[4] R. Aragona, A. Caranti, F. Dalla Volta and M. Sala, On the group generated by the round
functions of translation based ciphers over arbitrary fields, Finite Fields Appl., 25 (2014),
293–305.
[5] A. Bannier, N. Bodin and E. Filiol, Partition-Based Trapdoor Ciphers, Cryptology ePrint
Archive, Report 2016/493, 2016.
[6] A. Bannier, and E. Filiol, Partition-based trapdoor ciphers, IntechOpen, London, 2017.
[7] E. Biham and A. Shamir. Differential cryptanalysis of DES-like cryptosystems, Journal of
CRYPTOLOGY, 4 (1991), 3–72.
[8] M. Calderini, A note on some algebraic trapdoors for block ciphers, Advances in Mathematics
of Communications, 12 (2018), 515–524.
[9] M. Calderini, and M. Sala, Elementary abelian regular subgroups as hidden sums for crypto-
graphic trapdoors, preprint, arXiv:math.GR/1702.00581, 2017.
[10] A. Caranti, F. Dalla Volta and M. Sala, On some block ciphers and imprimitive groups, Appl.
Algebra Engrg. Comm. Comput., 20 (2009), 339–350.
[11] A. Caranti, F. Dalla Volta and M. Sala, An application of the O’Nan-Scott theorem to the
group generated by the round functions of an AES-like cipher, Des. Codes Cryptogr., 52 (2009),
293–301.
[12] D. Coppersmith and E. Grossman, Generators for certain alternating groups with applications
to cryptography, SIAM J. Appl. Math., 29 (1975), 624–627.
[13] J. Daemen and V. Rijmen, The design of Rijndael: AES – the Advanced Encryption Standard,
Information Security and Cryptography, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2002.
[14] Federal information processing standards publication, Data Encryption Standard and others,
National Bureau of Standards, US Department of Commerce, 1977.
[15] E. Goursat, Sur les substitutions orthogonales et les divisions re´gulie`res de l’espace, Ann. Sci.
E´cole Norm. Sup., 3 (1889), 9–102.
[16] C. Harpes and J. L. Massey, Partitioning cryptanalysis, Fast Software Encryption, Lecture
Notes in Comput. Sci., 1267 (1997), 13–27.
[17] Jr. B. S. Kaliski, R. L. Rivest and A. T. Sherman, Is the Data Encryption Standard a group?
(Results of cycling experiments on DES), J. Cryptology, 1 (1988), 3–36.
[18] K. G. Paterson, Imprimitive permutation groups and trapdoors in iterated block ciphers, Fast
Software Encryption, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., 1636 (1999), 201–214.
[19] J. Petrillo, Goursat’s other theorem, The College Mathematics Journal, 40(2009), 119–124.
[20] C. E. Shannon, Communication theory of secrecy systems, Bell System Tech., 28 (1949),
656–715.
[21] R. Sparr and R. Wernsdorf, Group theoretic properties of Rijndael-like ciphers, Discrete Appl.
Math., 156 (2008), 3139–3149.
[22] R. Wernsdorf, The round functions of RIJNDAEL generate the alternating group, Fast Soft-
ware Encryption, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., 2365 (2002), 143–148.
[23] R. Wernsdorf, The round functions of SERPENT generate the alternating group, 2000. Avail-
able from: http://csrc.nist.gov/archive/aes/round2/comments/20000512-rwernsdorf.
pdf.
[24] R. Wernsdorf, The one-round functions of the DES generate the alternating group, Advances
in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT ’92, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., 658 (1993), 99–112.
E-mail address: riccardo.aragona@univaq.it
E-mail address: marco.calderini@uib.no
E-mail address: roberto.civino@univaq.it
